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The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc 
Nadon, and the Supreme Court Act Reference
by Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton 
Jamie Cameron* 
THE “TENTH” JUSTICE1 
Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada are a prerogative of the 
prime minister, constrained only by minimal, threshold criteria of eligibil-
ity found in the Supreme Court Act (SCA).2 When Prime Minister Harper 
appointed a journeyperson, supernumerary member of the Federal Court 
of Appeal to one of Quebec’s three positions on the Court, those criteria 
provided collateral grounds to attack an appointment that was perceived 
as lacking in merit. At the time, there was abundant speculation that Prime 
Minister Harper named Justice Nadon in the hope that he would support 
the government’s positions and perhaps weaken the Court’s authority. 
The spectacle began after Marc Nadon was appointed to the Supreme 
Court on October 2, 2013 and sworn in a few days later on October 7. While 
his modest reputation as a jurist led to complaints that Nadon was not 
well qualifed, the appointment proved vulnerable on legal grounds. The 
question under the SCA was whether Quebec’s appointments to the Court 
were open only to current judges (i.e. of the Superior Court or Court of 
Appeal) and members of the Barreau du Québec. That was salient because 
Justice Nadon was a former member of the Quebec bar, having left in 1993 
to serve on the Federal Court, Trial Division before being appointed to the 
Federal Court of Appeal in 2001. 
* Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1 Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, The Tenth Justice: Judicial Appointments, Marc Nadon, 
and the Supreme Court Act Reference (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2020) [Tenth Justice]. 
2 RSC 1985, c S-26 [SCA]. 
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Amid a rising crisis, the Harper government inserted a corrective
amendment to the SCA in an omnibus bill and referred two questions to
the Supreme Court.3 While Justice Rothstein’s recusal left seven members
of the Court deciding the legality of a colleague’s appointment, Justice
Nadon was excused from duties, prohibited from having contact with the
other judges, and banished from the Supreme Court building.4 On March 21,
2014, with Justice Moldaver dissenting, the Court held that former mem-
bers of the Quebec judiciary and bar are not eligible for appointment to
the Supreme Court.5 In addition, the Court held that the rules for Supreme
Court appointment are subject to Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 and
subsection 41(d)’s requirement of unanimity between the federal govern-
ment and provinces.6 
The Reference re Supreme Court Act (Reference) meant that Justice 
Nadon’s appointment was void ab initio — or non-existent — and to this 
day the Supreme Court’s website neither acknowledges nor recognizes 
that Marc Nadon was ever a member of the Court.7 After a fashion, he is the 
“tenth justice” of the Court because the order-in-council appointing him 
was never revoked, and, as he has joked, he may still be a Supreme Court 
judge “in law.”8 Meanwhile, in May 2014 the prime minister and minister 
of justice’s accusations against then-Chief Justice McLachlin — accusing 
her of interfering with the appointment process — placed an ugly asterisk 
on the process.9 
Scholarship spotlighting landmark Supreme Court decisions and pivotal
moments of institutional history is invaluable. The Tenth Justice is an out-
growth of the authors’ earlier work and Professor Mathen’s appearance at
the House Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. It focuses
on the tussle over statutory construction and exposes testy relations
3 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 at para 7 [SCA Reference]. The ques-
tions were: (1) whether a former member of the Quebec bar was eligible for appointment 
under sections 5 and 6 of the SCA; and (2) whether Parliament could enact legislation 
specifying that former members of the bar are eligible for appointment. 
4 “Supreme Court Nominee Nadon Sequestered During Challenge to Appointment”, CBC 
News (4 November 2013), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/canada/supreme-court-nominee-
nadon-sequestered-during-challenge-to-appointment-1.2355381>. 
5 Ibid. 
6 See Part V, Procedure for Amending the Constitution, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
7 Justice Nadon returned to the Federal Court of Appeal and remained a member of the 
Court when The Tenth Justice was published. 
8 Tenth Justice, supra note 1 at 183. 











179 The Tenth Justice 
between the judicial and executive branches of government.10 Mathen and
Plaxton provide a rich analytical narrative of the debacle — from Nadon’s
appointment and its fallout, to issues of statutory interpretation, the Refer-
ence hearing, and the decision’s political, legal, and institutional aftermath.
If matters of statutory construction can be dry, The Tenth Justice is not,
ofering a riveting read and valuable perspective on an unprecedented and
anomalous event in Supreme Court history.
The Reference is a vexing decision because the prime minister’s seem-
ing disrespect for the Court makes it more difcult to criticize a majority 
opinion defending the institution. Though their sympathies are evident, 
Mathen and Plaxton refrain from staking a point of view, leaving readers 
to wrestle, as did the Court, with a dilemma. In a larger frame, the Refer-
ence posed the question of whether it was more principled for the judges 
to assert control over appointments to the Court and constitutionalize 
that issue, or to accept an interpretation of the SCA that left an appoint-
ment in place — one that was widely perceived as an unfriendly strike on 
the Court’s vitality and resilience. 
THE SCA: ABSURDITIES AND PURPOSES 
Appointment to one of Quebec’s seats on the Court depended on the rela-
tionship between sections 5 and 6 of the SCA — the general and special 
provisions — and whether the SCA treats eligibility the same way in Que-
bec and the rest of Canada.11 The majority opinion’s interpretation of sec-
tion 6 excluded Quebec members of the Federal Court from appointment 
to the Supreme Court, but not others — such as Justice Rothstein — from 
elsewhere in Canada. More generally, the Reference excluded all former 
members of the Quebec judiciary and bar from eligibility for appoint-
ment to the Court. That exclusion created a double standard between the 
four categories of general eligibility under section 5 — inclusive of cur-
rent and former members of the judiciary and bar — and section 6’s two 
10 See Michael Plaxton & Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the 
Supreme Court Act” (2013) 22:3 Const Forum Const 15. 
11 While section 5’s general provision specifes that a person who is or has been a judge of 
the Superior Court and barrister or advocate of at least ten years’ standing is eligible for 
appointment, section 6’s special provision provides that at least three of the Court’s mem-
bers must be appointed from the provincial Court of Appeal or Superior Court, or from 
among the advocates of Quebec. SCA, supra note 2, ss 5, 6. 










categories — exclusive to those with current membership on the bench or 
bar of Quebec. 
The grammatical construction of the provision was to some extent an 
exercise in absurdity, that of an “ecstasy of intellectualism.”12 One absurd-
ity under the SCA was that reading the provisions disjunctively meant that 
Quebec lawyers not subject to section 5’s requirement of ten years’ stand-
ing would be eligible for appointment to the Court immediately upon 
attaining membership in the Barreau du Québec. The majority opinion 
averted this absurdity by reading section 5’s ten-year requirement into sec-
tion 6, and then refused at the same time to incorporate section 5’s inclu-
sive defnition of eligibility. This discontinuity between the provisions 
generated another absurdity under section 6 because nothing prevented 
a former Quebec judge or lawyer from instantly becoming “current” — 
and eligible for appointment — by re-joining the bar. Justice Moldaver 
described this approach, of reading some aspects of section 5 into section 
6 but not others, as a form of “cherry-picking.”13 
The language of section 6 does not expressly require currency or 
exclude former members of the Quebec judiciary and bar, nor was the 
SCA’s legislative history defnitive one way or the other. In the circum-
stances, a supplementary rationale bolstered the majority’s conclusion 
that section 6 required current membership in the judiciary or bar. The 
well-established purpose of Quebec’s statutory allocation on the Court 
is to ensure the presence of civil law training, expertise, and traditions at 
the Court, and a majority of Quebec judges on fve-member panels decid-
ing civil law issues. To that, the majority opinion added a second pur-
pose — related to values of legitimacy and representation — of “enhancing 
the confdence of Quebec in the Court.”14 Under that reasoning, a require-
ment of currency was connected to confdence in the Court because 
Quebecers would not accept that those who are not “current members 
of civil law institutions” are qualifed to represent their interests on the 
Supreme Court of Canada.15 
Yet currency, without more, was a questionable proxy for values of 
representativeness and confdence. Justice Moldaver complained that 
importing Quebec’s “social values” into eligibility criteria 140 years after 
12 See Criss Jami Salomé, In Every Inch In Every Mile (USA: Createspace Independent Pub-
lishing Platform, 2011) at no 14. 
13 SCA Reference, supra note 3 at para 124. 





















181 The Tenth Justice 
the fact was “unsupported by the text and history of the Act.”16 Noting, 
as well, that residence in the province is not required, he observed that 
membership in the bar could rest on “the most tenuous link to the prac-
tice of civil law in Quebec.”17 Moreover, confdence in the Court would 
hardly be served if a former member could become eligible for appoint-
ment under section 6 by re-joining the Barreau for a single day.18 Justice 
Moldaver found it difcult to believe that Quebecers would have conf-
dence in an appointee who re-joined the bar for a day just to satisfy the 
currency requirement.19 
Those troubled by the prime minister’s exercise of the prerogative to
appoint Supreme Court justices might also be uncomfortable with a major-
ity opinion that failed to answer or displace the reasoning of the dissent,
and quite frankly appeared more outcome-oriented than principled. In this,
The Tenth Justice stopped short, and though co-authorship might have been
a complicating factor, Mathen and Plaxton do not express a clear point of
view.20 What is most intriguing about the Reference is the decision-mak-
ing dynamic of a difcult and unprecedented situation that challenged
the Court to decide whether to push back against the executive power of
appointment and how far to go in doing so. Much more could be said on
how the argument from principle could have gone in either direction and
what, ultimately, should have been determinative in the Reference. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF APPOINTMENTS 
Not only did the majority opinion create a double standard on eligibility, 
but it constitutionalized Supreme Court appointments and set unanim-
ity between the federal government and provinces as the threshold for 
amending the rules of Supreme Court appointment.21 Mathen and Plax-
ton describe this as “downright jaw-dropping”22 and “the most stunning 
aspect of the reference.”23 As they explain, constitutionalizing the SCA’s 
eligibility criteria may have the efect of making “perfectly legitimate 
16 Ibid at para 145. 
17 Ibid at para 150. 
18 Ibid at para 149. 
19 Ibid at paras 153–54. 
20 The authors did note the majority opinion’s failure to engage these concerns. Tenth Justice, 
supra note 1 at 104–05. 
21 SCA Reference, supra note 3 at paras 104–05. 
22 Tenth Justice, supra note 1 at 111. 
23 Ibid at 156. 









reforms” impossible, absent constitutional amendment.24 To the extent 
the Court looked “dangerously vulnerable” and was “right to worry” that 
this, or another prime minister, might alter the institution in fundamental 
ways — even abolishing it — the Reference removed some of that fragility.25 
But it did so at the expense of fexibility, with the “perhaps unintended 
side efect of choking of reforms” that could heighten the Court’s legit-
imacy and efectiveness.26 
Still, it was the prime minister’s appointment of Nadon and the federal 
government’s corrective amendment to the SCA that created the oppor-
tunity for the majority opinion to maximize its authority and constitution-
alize Supreme Court appointments. 
REASONABLE PEOPLE CAN DISAGREE 
The authors accept that “reasonable people can disagree” about the key 
issues at stake in the Reference.27 Quite apart from the SCA’s low-thresh-
old eligibility criteria, the executive power of appointment can undermine 
confdence in the Supreme Court in a variety of ways, such as making 
ill-considered appointments and disregarding the conventions around 
appointment. It is the existence of that power, not the opportunity to 
appoint a former judge or member of the provincial bar, that poses a 
more serious threat to public confdence in the Court. The risk that the 
power to appoint might be improperly and even subversively exercised is 
a function of the prerogative and a longstanding lack of transparency and 
accountability in appointments to the Court. Though appointments are 
now subject to a process, the prerogative remains in place.28 
In hindsight, it is not so obvious that appointing Justice Nadon or 
other former members of the Quebec judiciary or bar would undermine 
confdence in the Court in a legally or constitutionally signifcant way. By 
contrast, the Reference presents a strong counterofensive that changed 
the status of appointments and did so in a legally and constitutionally sig-
nifcant way. That is why reasonable people can certainly disagree about 
24 Ibid at 161. 
25 Ibid at 181. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid at 121, 123. 
28 See Ofce of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Afairs Canada, “Supreme Court of 
Canada Appointment Process - 2021” (19 February 2021), online: Government of Canada 
<www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/scc-csc/2021/index-eng.html>. 
183 The Tenth Justice 
whether the Court overreached its authority in this instance or acted, as 
expected and required, to protect the institution from the executive and 
legislative branches of government. 

